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Over the past few years, rising interest in the phenomenon
of death, as well as in parapsychology and the occult, has made
it intellectually respectable once again to deal seriously with the
issue of life-after-death. One aspect of the larger debate which
warrants careful exploration is the relationship between survival
and time within the context of Christian theology. But a discussion on survival will not prove worthwhile if it is conducted, as
too many such discussions are, loosely and informally, without
sufficient attention to detail. Both logical and linguistic considerations are very important. And since talk about life-afterdeath takes many different forms, it is crucial that we distinguish
among them.
1. Views of Survival
We will begin by clarifying various views of survival which
are held (rightly or wrongly, singly or in combination) by professed Christians. The most prominent of such views may be
classified under three categories, as follows:
A.

Personal
1. Immortality of the soul
2. Resurrection of the dead

B.

Impersonal
1. Biological
2. Influence
3. Memory
4. Process

C. Existential
In the first category, immortality and resurrection have in common the fact that they are concerned with personal survival,
i.e., the continuation after bodily death of the person (or, at
least, the essential part of the person), the subject of experiences.
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These two views1 can be differentiated as follows: Immortality
(deriving from Greek antecedents) involves a dualistic human
nature whose incorporeal soul/mind is "freed or "escapes" from
its corporeal/physical body at death. Resurrection ( a Hebrew
heritage) maintains a monistic human nature whose mind-body
ceases to exist at death and is later "recreated" (though not
necessarily out of the same "stuff"). In the former case, the soul's
survival is, so to speak, "automatic" (Christians, however, insist
that it is still ordained by God) because while soul and body
interact or influence each other, they remain two separate and
separable substances. Thus death is conceived as analogous to
passing through a door from one room into another. In resurrection, on the other hand, a person's survival is neither automatic
nor guaranteed. Death (as non-existence) is the natural end of
life, and only a special divine act enables life to begin once more,
since God must make over again the same individual (in an
appropriate sense of "same"). Both immortality and resurrection
stress that at least something of us survives death: our personalities and characters continue, and we are able to have further
experiences of some sort.
The four views of survival which I have called "impersonal"
are alike in not depicting a person as continuing to have experiences of any kind after death. What those who hold such views
have in mind is something else: First, in terms of biological
"immortality," what survives is our genetic material (via sperm
or ovum) passed on to our offspring. We "live on in our children"
( and other descendants ) . Second, we also c'survive" by means of
our influence. Whether this influence turns out to be large or
small, we do affect other people and indeed the world itself:
our lives make some difference! Third, we likewise 'live on"
in the memories of a few fellow human beings. Now, these three
positions are frequently interwoven, as one might expect. And
l I have attempted an exposition of these two positions along with an
analysis of their strengths and weaknesses in my article "Immortality and
Resurrection: A Reappraisal," Religion in Life, 43 (Autumn 1974): 312-324.
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they seem to have an advantage over their counterparts in that
we know that they actually occur. Yet the type of survival which
they envision is significantly limited vis-a-vis most other options.
They are limited in impact and duration as well as by the fact
that it is not we ourselves who survive.
The fourth view in my second category, the process view,2
is similarly impersonal, though rather more permanent. The concept is that although we do not survive death as experiencing
subjects, we do survive in God. "Within the process framework
immortality means that my experiences, intentions, feelings, joy,
sorrows, goals, and decisions, because they have also been experienced fully by a related and perfect God, are retained as they
were forever in the memory of God? Our lives, then, along
with the values in them, are preserved intact forever. And they
will possibly be used by God in his ongoing creative relationship
with the world.
The existential view, given as my third major classification,
appears in many forms,4 but its basic points are fairly standard.
This view does not deal with life-after-death in terms of that
period of time following our demise; rather it focuses exclusively
on the here-and-now. Its advocates insist that eschatological
language (in fact, all theological language) is a language of selfunderstanding and commitment. In other words, for an individual
to assert his or her belief in resurrection, immortality, or survival
of death is roughly equivalent to asserting his or her openness
to life, to confidence and security, and to decision for authentic
existence. Perhaps it is not too great an oversimplification to say
that the existential understanding is primarily one of personal
psychology.
* T h e best summary and evaluation of this position which I know is to be
found in Tyron Inbody, "Process Theology and Personal Survival," Zli8 Review, 31 (Spring 1974) : 31-42.
Zbid., p. 35.
There are philosophers in this camp like Heidegger, as well as theologians
such as Tillich (whose approach is more ontological) and Bultmann (whose
approach is more anthropological).
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2. "Eternal Life," "Suruiual," and "Time"
Given the foregoing background information, we can now
turn to the question of survival's connection with the concept of
time. But the views as presented here do not appear to have
suggested anything very problematical or philosophically interesting about that particular issue.5 The underlying problem surrounding survival and time can, in my opinion, be best illustrated
perhaps by reference to the notion of eternal life.

Use of the Term "Eternal Life"
The Christian idea of eternal life has a long and distinguished
history going back to the Bible.6 Those who hold it are usually
trying to emphasize two points (minimally). First is the presumption that meaningful and self-fulfilling survival does not
come either automatically or inevitably as our "right"; i.e., that
survival is neither a logical necessity nor a "law of nature."
Adherents of eternal life insist that survival depends, instead,
entirely upon the will of God. Second is the assumption that
life-after-death involves something besides the mere continuance
of one's human character and personality for a time after bodily
death. This "something more" is the conviction that what really
counts is the quality of life rather than its quantity; or, to put
this in Christian perspective, eternal life has more to do with our
entering into a special relationship with God ( available anytime )
than with the mere extension of our life through time. Insofar as
these two points are concerned, eternal life is compatible with
each of the survival views already discussed.

Nontemporal Survival
There is, however, a further point that is not advanced by
every exponent of eternal life, but which is truly divisive. This
1 must admit to being perplexed about some of the details and implications of those positions, along with great apprehension over whether the views
may be confused or inconsistent.
We find it in all the gospels-infrequently outside of John, however-and
in most of the other N T writings as well.
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additional aspect revolves around an attempt to preclude eternal
life from continuing on into the hereafter, and springs from the
supposition that eternal life lies (in some sense) beyond the
limits of time.
Nicholas Berdyaev, e.g., has written: "Eternal life is not a
future life but life in the present, life in the depths of an instant
of time"? and, more specifically, "There can be no eternity in
time.'" And George W. Forell, in a popular textbook, echoes the
same sentiment:
While the faith in the resurrection has always been a basic
part of the Protestant Faith, the state between the death of a
person and his resurrection has been widely and inconclusively
debated by theologians. T h e fundamental problem in all these
discussions is the assumption that time is not only a category
of the human mind but also a reality in God. T h e problem disappears, however, if one is prepared to take seriously the scriptural evidence that in God there is no time. . . .
In line with the biblical witness it appears to be more accurate
to assert that death means confrontation with the living God.
Thus man is confronted by eternity at the moment of his death
and no longer subject to the limitations of human time?

Eternal life is thereby conceived to be nontemporal.
Now, whatever one may think about this sort of language
with respect to God (and we will deal with that topic shortly)i.e., that the concept of time does not apply to Him-one should
be cognizant of the fact that this nontemporal view requires
abandonment of the traditional Christian understanding of survival; namely, it means giving up the concept that the surviving individual will continue to have experience~.I confess to having
great difficulty in grasping the idea of nontemporal survival;
and while I can see ways of interpreting it, these seem hardly
satisfactory.
*Nicholas Berdyaev, T h e Destiny of Man, 4th ed. (London: Geoffrey Bles,
1954), pp. 261-262.
Zbid., p. 252. Author's italics deleted.
George W. Forell, T h e Protestant Faith (Englewood Cliffs, N . J . : PrenticeHall, 1960), pp. 247-248. Emphasis added.

392

DAVID A. SPIELER

For instance, one way of interpreting the remarks about nontemporal survival is simply to say that they reflect a basic confusion and inconsistency. Why? We may consider for a moment
the oddity of combining Berdyaev's statement quoted earlier
("There can be no eternity in time") with the following comment,
also by Berdyaev: "In eternity, in the spiritual world, there
goes on a struggle for personality, for the realization of God's
idea. Our natural earthly life is but a moment in the process
which takes place in the spiritual world."1° But unless I am very
much mistaken, if events (even spiritual ones) occur in succession (as indicated in the last quotation), then they can be
ordered in a temporal sequence (in opposition to the first
quotation). And if for some reason they cannot be so ordered,
then they cannot constitute either a "process" or a "struggle."
It might well be that such a spiritual time-series would not
coincide with our own, but to claim (as the nontemporalists
appear to) that changes occur, though not in time, is just misleading."
Another possible way of interpreting the suggestion about nontemporal eternal life is to hold that it is not the sort of thing which
can take place in time, just as a day of the week is not the sort
of thing which can have weight. This may initially sound
promising, but I fear that it is not, for we would be making eternal
life into something which cannot, by its very nature, be linked
with our ordinary concept of a person. Why? Because the only
things that can reasonably be called "eternal" in this sense are
abstractions-abstractions which are not now, never have been,
and never will be in time. Persons, however, obviously are and
have been in time; and if they are able to survive death at all,
it is hard to imagine how they could possibly be removed from
time.
Berdyaev, p. 258.
Change, therefore, implies time. Whether time implies change is, fortunately, a question which has no bearing on our immediate problem.
l1
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Dynamic versus Static
The language of nontemporal survival makes sense if we
understand that it is associated with something such as the
existential position (and restricted to that). But if we attempt to
move beyond this limited perspective, we will be forced to
choose between a static view of survival "beyond" time and a
dynamic view of survival "in" time. I am convinced that we
cannot have both.
If we opt for a dynamic-i.e., temporal-interpretation of
survival ( or eternal life), then it is entirely compatible with the
notion of personal survival as continuing experiences, process,
change, and struggle. If, on the other hand, we accept a statici.e., nontemporal-interpretation of survival ( or eternal life ), then
it will turn out to be either incompatible with the concept of
personal survival (in the previously mentioned sense) or else
internally inconsistent.
The situation is simply this: Those who believe in or advocate
personal survival must reject the nontemporal (static) interpretation, and conversely, those who accept the nontemporal (static)
interpretation must relinquish any hope of personal survival.
Experiences after death can occur only if they are in some
sense "in" time.

God and Time
Although the problem of God and time is not necessarily
identical with the problem of human beings and time, it may be
worthwhile to inquire as to why people have wanted to say that
in God there is no time. Perhaps along the way we shall discover
some hint as to the motives of those who seek to remove us from
time as well.
For one thing, we certainly want to hold that God is not
circumscribed by our human temporal limitations. He is "everlasting" in a sense and on a level different from what we experience in this world: He has no beginning and no ending. His
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existence is independent and necessary, in contrast to the
dependent and contingent nature of everything else. The Scriptures are indicative on this:
Before the mountains were brought forth,
or ever thou hast formed the earth and the world,
from everlasting to everlasting thou art God.
0

.

0

0

.

For a thousand years in thy sight
are but as yesterday when it is past,
or as a watch in the night.12

God is "timeless" both in comparison with all else (creator versus
creation) and in terms of a vast difference in God's subjective or
psychological apprehension of time from our own.
For another thing, and closely related to the first, is the longstanding belief that God created time, and hence cannot really be
"in" time. Gen 1 tells how God created the heavens and the earth,
sun and stars, light and darkness-in effect, all those features by
which people have determined the flow of time. Certainly in
this sense God is "beyond time, though this does not touch
every temporal concept.
A third motive for wanting to separate God from time is the
close relationship which exists generally between time and
change, and, more particularly, between time and the twin processes of growth and decay. Many Christians, I believe, are fearful that placing God in time would inevitably make Him subject
to corruption. Why? Because if one regards God as already
perfect, it may be difficult to conceive how He could possibly
change without becoming less perfect. This same fear appears to
be behind various attempts at denying that God has any real
involvement with the world, as well as at denying that He
responds or reacts to what happens in the world; for to allow
such experiences might seem tantamount to God's changing
according to changes in the world (thereby relinquishing absolute
la

PS 90:2,4. Cf. 2 Pet 3:s.
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perfection and possibly losing complete control of his own
creation) .I3
Of these three motivations for removing God from time, only
the last raises a legitimate philosophical issue (since the others
are actually making points which are not controversial, though
they are doing so by stretching language further than its ordinary
applications). This last claim-that relatedness and even change
would make God somehow imperfect and "powerless"-is both
false and without biblical foundation. Unless one adopts the
mathematical model of perfection, i.e., that to be perfect a
quality must be extended without limit (to infinity), there is
no justification for supposing that either relatedness or change
are equivalent to imperfection." Besides, the language of the OT
and NT supports the view that God is perfect (in whatever
sense that term had meaning for those people), and yet He
experiences, responds, and changes. The "timeless" nature of God
never breaks loose from its temporal origins in the Bible. And to
the degree that this discussion bears on the question of personal
survival, much the same can be said.

3. Conclusion
As we have noted, there is a rather wide variety of survival
concepts-running from the traditional immortality and resurrection through process and social to existential. We have also seen
that time becomes a genuine problem only when there is an
attempt to join personal survival (thought of as continuing
experiences) with nontemporality, an effort often cast in the
language of eternal life. Our examination of this problem has
shown quite clearly, however, that one cannot literally have
personal survival of death coupled with real nontemporality.
l3The similarity of such reasoning to that of the ancient Greeks and the
ancient Gnostics is, of course, apparent.
l4 The influence of Greek philosophy on later Christian thought is no doubt
responsible for the introduction of this mathematical model of perfection.
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Paul Tillich, despite his existentialist leanings, was able to
perceive the need for keeping personal survival closely tied to
time. First, Tillich argued that the language of life-after-death
demands self-conscious individualization.15 Second, he contended
that the language of life-after-death requires time and change:
Self-consciousness . . . depends on temporal changes both of
the perceiving subject and of the perceived object in the process
of self-consciousness. . . . Without time and change in time, subject and object would merge into each other; the same would
perceive the same indefinitely. It would be similar to a state of

Truly it is worth the effort to understand how survival and
time fit together, and how they do not.

% P a u l Tillich, Systematic Theology, 3 (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1963): 413-414.
l6 Zbid., p. 414.

